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Abstract: This article examines why, how, and with what results have judicial 
councils spread under the influence of European institutions throughout Central and 
Eastern Europe in the course of the last twenty years. It first traces back how the 
judicial councils, themselves just one possible form of administration of courts, have 
emerged as the recommended universal solution Europe-wide and internationally. 
Second, it discusses how has this model been exported under the patronage of 
European and international institutions to transition countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Assessing, thirdly, the reality of the functioning of such new judicial councils 
in these countries, in particular in Slovakia and Hungary, with the Czech Republic 
without a judicial council providing a counter-example, it is suggested that their 
impact on further judicial and legal transition has been either questionable or outright 
disastrous. This brings, eventually, into question the legitimacy as well as the bare 
reasonableness of the entire process of European/international standards setting and 
their later marketing or in reality rather imposition onto the countries in transition. 
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1) INTRODUCTION 
 
Judicial independence appears on most laundry lists of all bodies or institutions 
engaged with the rule of law. It is considered an unqualified public good. As a result, 
all major players engaged in legal reform and rule of law building diverted significant 
resources to this issue. For instance, the United Nations created the office of Special 
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers in 1994. The World Bank 
has been investing heavily in judicial reforms in Latin America and Asia. Within 
Europe, the Council of Europe has been pushing for judicial independence and 
judicial reform throughout the Continent. The European Union included judicial 
independence among its core requirements for the accession countries. Both 
organisations, the European Union as well as the Council of Europe, then jointly 
encouraged legal and judicial reforms in Central and Eastern Europe (hereinafter the 
CEE). Finally, a number of non-governmental organisations have likewise paid 
considerable attention to this issue.  
 
How to achieve judicial independence, in particular in countries in CEE as well as in 
other countries in transition, tends to be frequently reduced, however, to just one 
aspect: the institutional reform. Furthermore, the institutional reform itself has been 
typically limited to promoting one particular model of court administration: the Judicial 
Council model. The model has been suggested as the universal and “right” solution 
that should eradicate the vices of previous models, in particular the administration of 
courts by a Ministry of Justice. The new Judicial Council model ought to enhance 
judicial independence. It should insulate the judiciary from political tumult. It should 
also improve the overall performance of judges.  
 
The new model thus came with the promise of independent, better functioning 
judiciary. The main argument of this paper is that in transition countries in the CEE, 
the universally promoted “Euro-model” of the court administration in the form of a 
Judicial Council has not lived up to that promise. It did not deliver the goods it was 
supposed to. Even more: in a number of countries in the region, the situation has 
been made worse following the establishment of a Judicial Council. The new 
institution typically halted further reforms of the judiciary and soon negated the values 
in the name of which it has been put in place. This evolution seriously questions not 
only the further promotion of the Judicial Council model elsewhere in the world, but 
also the very international process of standards setting which put in place and 
promoted such a model. 
 
The argument of this paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2 and 3 critically examine 
how international and European “soft standard”, which were later pushed onto the 
CEE transition countries, emerged. Who and how designed these standards? 
Section 4 suggests why in the end the Judicial Council model prevailed over all 
competing alternatives of court administration in Europe, and why it has been 
promoted by the international actors. Section 5 analyses normative shortcomings of 
such “European” or “global” models in terms of democracy and legitimacy. Section 6 
shows with which incentives and by which actors has the Judicial Council model 
been in fact imposed onto most of the CEE countries in the course of their transition. 
Sections 7 and 8 stand in contrast to each other: section 7 outlines what outcomes 
the Judicial Council model was supposed to deliver, while Section 8 looks at what it 
in fact delivered and how it has been operating in the CEE states in reality. 
Conclusions in section 9 are humble. It is suggested that when transforming 
judiciaries, it is essential to focus first on personal renewal and small scale function-
related court reforms than on grand schemes of irreversible and constitutionally 
entrenched constitutional designs. Making a post-totalitarian judiciary a self-
administrative body before any genuine internal change and renewal has taken place 
will result in a formally constitutionally “independent judiciary” with rather dependent 
judges in it.1  
 
2) HOW DO EUROPEAN STANDARDS OF COURT ADMINISTRATION EMERGE? 
 
Where do European and global2 standards with respect to the “proper” way of 
administering courts come from? Two questions are essential in this respect: who 
drafts these standards and according to what processes? The answer to the former 
question is straightforward: it is typically judges themselves. The answer to the latter 
question is more complicated. The processes of creating European or “global” 
standards of court administration vary from one international organization to another. 
Furthermore, the processes tend to be quite opaque, with only limited access to 
information regarding their rules and design. 
 
On the level of the United Nations, it was the General Assembly which adopted 
already in 1985 the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (“UN Basic 
Principles”).3 While UN Basic principles addressed several aspects of court 
administration in the broader sense,4 they merely set the goals. The States were left 
to choose the means how to meet those goals.5 The 2002 Bangalore Principles of 
Judicial Conduct (“Bangalore Principles”)6 took a similar approach. These principles 
explicitly called for enhancing “institutional independence of the judiciary”.7 But they 
stopped short of advocating for a particular model of court administration. They 
instead zeroed in on six general values which ought to be pursued: independence, 
impartiality, integrity, propriety, equality, competence and diligence.8 
 
The process that led to the drafting of 2002 Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct 
clearly illuminates the shift towards a greater role of judges in defining standards of 
court administration. The origin of the Bangalore Principles dates back to the meeting 
of the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity in Bangalore, India in 
February 2001 (therefore “Bangalore Principles”). The meeting united eight chief 
justices from Asia and Africa. In the meeting, they drafted a code of judicial conduct 
that was supposed to complement the UN Basic Principles “[i]n light of increasing 
                                                          
1 Contrast Ferejohn who referred to the U.S. judiciary as “[the] system of independent judges within a 
dependent judiciary” - John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial 
Independence, 72 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 353, at 362 (1999). 
2 Throughout this paper, we look primarily at the European judicial standards. However, a number of 
suggestions and arguments made with respect to the European standards is also applicable with 
respect to world-wide or “global” standards (see e.g. VIOLANE AUTHEMAN & SANDRA ELENA, GLOBAL BEST 
PRACTICES-JUDICIAL COUNCILS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (2004); Linn 
Hammergren, Do Judicial Councils Further Judicial Reform? Lessons from Latin America, WORKING-
PAPER SERIES DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW PROJECT NO. 28 (2002); or Brent T. White, Rotten to the 
Core: Project Capture and the Failure of Judicial Reform in Mongolia, 4 EAST ASIA LAW REFORM 209 
(2009)), as far as such can genuinely exist, thus warranting to use the adverb “global”. Seen from a 
different angle, it might be also suggested that European judicial standards is the most-developed 
subset of a world-wide standardisation trend. 
3 Adopted at the Seventh UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held 
in Milan in 1985, endorsed by GA Res 40/32, 29 November 1985, A/RES/40/32 and GA Res 40/146, 13 
December 1985, A/RES/40/32. 
4 Note that the term “court administration” has a broader meaning in Europe than in the United States. In 
Europe, it includes also selection, promotion and discipline of judges. 
5 See e.g. principle no. 10 (“Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial 
appointments for improper motives”), or principle no. 13 (“Promotion of judges, wherever such a system 
exists, should be based on objective factors, in particular ability, integrity and experience”), or no. 17 (“A 
charge or complaint made against a judge in his/her judicial and professional capacity shall be 
processed expeditiously and fairly under an appropriate procedure.”). 
6 Report of the Special Rapporteur, 10 January 2003, E/CN.4/2003/65 Annex. 
7 The 2002 Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, para. 1.5. 
8 Report of the Special Rapporteur, 10 January 2003, E/CN.4/2003/65 Annex. 
reports of judicial corruption, and sensing a lack of guidance on measures of judicial 
accountability”.9 This code, partly revised, was subsequently adopted by the UN 
Special Rapporteur Param Cumaraswamy.10  
 
The UN thus ex post provided this in fact private initiative with a “veil of legitimacy” in 
the form of institutional approval. However, the input from other law professionals 
than judges, e.g. from government officials, scholars and other stakeholders, in the 
drafting process, was minimal. What is even more striking is that despite the clear 
motivation behind this code, there is not a single mention of words “corruption” or 
“accountability” in Bangalore Principles. Instead, Bangalore Principles start with a 
bold paragraph, which, if taken in its fullness, would represent an antithesis to judicial 
accountability:  
“A judge shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of the judge's 
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the 
law, free of any extraneous influences, inducements, pressures, threats or 
interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason”.11 
 
In contrast to the UN level, in Europe, the process of standardization of court 
administration went much further and deeper. This process can be roughly divided 
into two periods. The first period spans from the 1950s until the early 1990s. The 
second period lasts from the early 1990s until today. Until the early 1990s, neither 
the European Union (EU) nor the Council of Europe (CoE) paid significant attention 
to the models of court administration. The turning point was the adoption of the EU 
Copenhagen criteria in 1993 and the ensuing EU accession process and its 
conditionality vis-à-vis the candidate countries.12 Since then, the EU as well as the 
CoE considerably increased their resources devoted to setting the standards of court 
administration. The synergic effect of activities of these two international 
organizations in turn created strong pressure mainly on the CEE States13 to put their 
models of court administration in sync with the promoted European Judicial Council 
model (JC model). 
 
The CoE gave a preference to the JC model of court administration as early as in 
1994.14 On the other hand, at that period, a diversity of models across Europe was 
still acknowledged. The CoE refrained from proposing to change the alternative 
systems of court administration that “in practice work[ed] well”.15 However, over the 
years, both the EU and the CoE have abandoned their initial flexibility and became 
staunch advocates of the JC model. In the 2004 enlargement wave that involved 
mainly former communist Central European and Baltic States,16 the European 
                                                          
9 Lorne Neudorf, Promoting Independent Justice in a Changing World, 12 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 
107, at 112 (2012).  
10 Report of the Special Rapporteur, 10 January 2003, E/CN.4/2003/65 Annex. 
11 The 2002 Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, para 1.1. [highlighted by the authors]. 
12 Cristina Parau, The Drive for Judicial Supremacy, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION (Anja 
Seibert-Fohr ed., 2012) 619, at 643. 
13 But note that the pushing for one JC Euro-model is by now no longer limited to the CEE. For instance, 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE has recently criticized Germany for not having a judicial council. 
See Resolution 1685 (2009), Allegations of politically-motivated abuses of the criminal justice system in 
CoE member states, adopted 30 September 2009, para. 5.4.1. For further details, see also Anja Seibert-
Fohr, European Perspective on the Rule of Law and Independent Courts, 20 JOURNAL FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK 
161, at 166 (2012), who argues that the problem of recent documents produced by the CoE is that they 
have gradually shifted the emphasis from obligations of results to obligations of means. 
14 Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (94) 12, 13 October 1994, printed in: 37 YEARBOOK 
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 453 (1994). Principle I 2 c).  
15 Id. Explanatory Memorandum in the Annex, at para. 16. 
16 Namely Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. The 
other two countries which joined the EU also in the 2004 enlargement were Malta and Cyprus.  
Commission used the so-called “pre-accession conditionality”17 to exercise significant 
pressure on Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia and enticed them to adopt the JC model. In 
Slovakia, the European Commission succeeded and the Judicial Council of the 
Slovak Republic came into being in 2002. Estonia adopted a somewhat modified 
Judicial Council “Euro-model” in the same year. Latvia resisted the pressure and 
eventually created its judicial council only in 2010.18 The European Commission went 
even further in the 2007 enlargement wave and basically required from Romania and 
Bulgaria to adopt the JC model “as it is”.19 
 
The eventual creation of the Judicial Council “Euro-model” presents a puzzle. Neither 
the EU nor the CoE have ever laid down any normative underpinnings of this model. 
There has never been any process of review or discussion of the model similar to 
those that apply to adopting EU legislation or to the drafting of an international treaty. 
Both organizations just internalized the recommendations of various judicial 
consultative bodies, without much addressing or assessing their content.  
 
The intricate web of different consultative bodies that have played a major role in 
setting this standard is in itself difficult to disentangle.20 There is nonetheless one 
thing that all of these consultative bodies have in common: judges have a significant 
and often even a decisive voice therein. For instance, the Consultative Council of 
European Judges (CCJE), an advisory body of the CoE on issues related to the 
independence, impartiality and competence of judges, is composed exclusively of 
judges. Similarly, the Lisbon Network, consultative body of the CoE in the field of 
judicial education, consists of judges only, namely judges who are directors or deputy 
directors of national judicial schools. The European Network for Councils for the 
Judiciary, an independent body, politically and financially supported by the European 
Commission, which is particularly active in setting the standards of court 
administration, is open to representatives of other professions, but judges have a 
majority there too. Even in the Venice Commission, the CoE's advisory body on 
constitutional matters writ large, whose composition is most diverse, judges have an 
upper hand. 
 
In other words, judges control virtually all European bodies that deal with issues of 
court administration. Given the fact that the European standards of court 
administration are created by judges themselves, it is not surprising that these 
standards are based on the belief that the rule of law is best served by judicial 
autonomy.21 This belief materialises in the vision of a very robust institutional 
separation of the judiciary from the rest of legal and political institutions within the 
national state.  
 
3) WHAT WAS IN THE PACKAGE? THE CORE REQUIREMENTS OF THE EURO-MODEL  
 
Officially, there is no formal document that would define any required “Euro-model” or 
even “global” model of court administration. Therefore, we must excavate the 
parameters of this model from various documents originating from diverse bodies of 
the United Nations, the European Union and the Council of Europe, with further 
                                                          
17 Further below, section 6.  
18 Generally on the double or even multiple standards in the accession process, see e.g. DIMITRY 
KOCHENOV, EU ENLARGEMENT AND THE FAILURE OF CONDITIONALITY 264-266 & 271-290 (2008). 
19 See e.g., Daniel Smilov, EU Enlargement and the Constitutional Principle of Judicial Independence, in 
SPREADING DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW: THE IMPACT OF EU ENLARGEMENT ON THE RULE OF LAW, 
DEMOCRACY, AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POST-COMMUNIST LEGAL ORDERS (Adam Czarnota, & Martin 
Krygier & Wojciech Sadurski eds., 2006) 313, at 323-325; or Parau, supra note 12. 
20 For a comprehensive overview of these bodies, see DANIELA PIANA, JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITIES IN NEW 
EUROPE: FROM RULE OF LAW TO QUALITY OF JUSTICE (2010), chapter 2. 
21 Parau, supra note 12, at 646-647.  
impetus coming from the World Bank and other international organisations. One may 
object that there is no single model of judicial council advocated jointly by these 
international and supranational bodies and that these organizations do not 
necessarily agree on its requirements. This may be true with respect to a “global” 
model. However, on the European level, a number of documents of the EU22 and the 
institutional dialogue between the relevant bodies of the EU and the CoE23 rebut this 
objection and reveal that there is mutual agreement on this issue.  
 
There are six key requirements of the JC Euro-model which may be distilled from the 
plethora of documents produced by numerous organs and affiliated bodies of the EU 
and the CoE, namely: 
 
(1) a judicial council should have constitutional status;24  
(2) at least 50% of the members of the judicial council must be judges and these 
judicial members must be selected by their peers, i.e. by other judges;25  
(3) a judicial council ought to be vested with decision-making and not merely advisory 
powers;26  
(4) a judicial council should have substantial competences in all matters concerning 
the career of a judge including selection, appointment, promotion, transfer, dismissal 
and disciplining;27  
(5) a judicial council must be chaired either by the President or Chief Justice of the 
Highest Court or the neutral head of state;28 and  
(6) court presidents and vice-presidents are not precluded from becoming members 
of the judicial council. No maximum ratio of these judicial officials among judicial 
members of the judicial council is generally set.29  
 
This set of six criteria is by no means the definitive or exhaustive list of requirements 
and recommendations proposed by the EU and the CoE. Many documents produced 
by these two organizations demanded more stringent criteria as well as additional 
requirements.30 The abovementioned set is rather the highest common denominator 
of what is expected and what the EU and the CoE advocate for.  
                                                          
22 See, e.g. Anja Seibert-Fohr, Judicial Independence in European Union Accessions: The Emergence 
of a European Basic Principle, 52 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INT’L LAW 405 (2009).  
23 Piana, supra note 20. 
24 The European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-
2011, para. 1.4; and Opinion no. 10 (2007) of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) to 
the attention of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the Council for the Judiciary at 
the service of society, Strasbourg, 21-23 November 2007, para. 11. See also European Charter on the 
Statute for Judges, Strasbourg, 8 -10 July 1998, para. 1.2. 
25 ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, para. 2.1; and CCJE, Opinion no. 10 (2007), 
para. 18. See also European Charter on the Statute for Judges, Strasbourg, 8 -10 July 1998, para. 1.3; 
Resolution of the ENCJ on “Self Governance for the Judiciary: Balancing Independence and 
Accountability” of May 2008 (hereinafter only “Budapest Resolution”), para. 4 (b); and Recommendation 
CM/Rec (2010) 12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency 
and responsibilities, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 November 2010, para. 27. 
26 ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, paras. 3.4 and 3.13; CCJE, Opinion no. 10 
(2007), paras. 48, 49 and 60. See also European Charter on the Statute for Judges, Strasbourg, 8 -10 
July 1998, paras. 3.1, 4.1. and 7.2.; and Recommendation CM/Rec (2010) 12 of the Committee of 
Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities, adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 17 November 2010, para. 46. 
27 ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, para. 3.1; and CCJE, Opinion no. 10 (2007), 
para. 42. See also European Charter on the Statute for Judges, Strasbourg, 8 -10 July 1998, para. 1.3. 
28 ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, para. 4.1; CCJE, Opinion no. 10 (2007), para. 33.  
29 CCJE, Opinion no. 10 (2007), para. 26. Contrast, however, ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 
2010-2011, para. 2; European Charter on the Statute for Judges, Strasbourg, 8 -10 July 1998, para. 1.3; 
“Budapest Resolution”, para. 4 (b); and Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)12, para. 27. Similarly, the JC 
Euro-model does not set any limit on the number of senior judges of appellate and top courts. 
30 For instance, some documents preclude the participation of the Minister of Justice in the judicial 
council or require judicial councils to have budgetary powers, oversee judicial training, process 
 
It is clear that these criteria may not always be framed as “must requirements”. The 
documents employ “should language”. However, the language should not obfuscate 
the obligatory nature of these requirements for the so-called “new democracies” in 
Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, most the EU and the CoE documents use the 
“should language” for two reasons. First, the “should language” carves out 
exceptions for the so-called “old democracies” in Europe, which are not willing to 
modify their current models of court administration. Second, the “should language” is 
employed in order to make these documents as inclusive as possible and to speak 
also to bodies in some European states which represent different styles of court 
administration, such the Court Service model,31 or hybrid models of court 
administration.32 
 
As is apparent from the six requirements listed, the “self-government” of judges 
represents a golden thread running through all six criteria.33 Some documents make 
this claim more explicit when they stress that the judicial council must “secure the 
independence of the judiciary ‘from every other power’”, that is from the executive 
and the legislature (not from the judiciary), and “ensure effective self-governance”.34  
 
4) WHAT WAS NOT INCLUDED? COMPETING MODELS OF COURT ADMINISTRATION 
 
In order to see the specific features of the promoted JC Euro-model of court 
administration more clearly, it is helpful to juxtapose this model with its alternatives. 
This short detour should also save this paper from a common vice in the scholarship 
on judicial systems, namely that scholars tend to compare only countries with judicial 
councils and debates therein and ignore countries without judicial councils and 
debates therein.35 We will start with the models of court administration present in 
Europe and then locate the JC model among these alternatives. Subsequently, we 
will also briefly look beyond Europe. 
 
There are broadly speaking five models of court administration in use in Europe:36  
(1) the Ministry of Justice model;  
(2) the judicial council model;  
(3) the courts service model;  
(4) hybrid models; and  
(5) the socialist model.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
complaints from the users of courts, comment on bills affecting the judiciary or propose new legislation. 
See e.g. ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, paras. 3.5-3.9 and 3.14-3.18; or CCJE, 
Opinion no. 10 (2007), paras 65-90. 
31 The Court Service model is sometimes referred to as a “Northern European Model” of judicial council - 
see e.g. Wim Voermans & Pim Albers, Councils for the Judiciary in EU Countries, European Council for 
the Efficiency of Justice, CEPEJ (2003). We reject this label as unhelpful and misleading; see also Nuno 
Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence, 57 
AM. J. OF COMP. LAW 103, at 109, note 20 (2009), 
32 These different models are described immediately below in the following section. 
33 It could be suggested that the term “self-government model” should be used instead of the “judicial 
council model”. In our opinion, however, the term “judicial council model” captures better the nature of 
the institutional design in question of which the judicial self-government is an important but not the sole 
component. Furthermore, the “judicial council model” is also the term under which the model has been 
promoted and marketed in the CEE. 
34 ENCJ Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, para. 1.4. 
35 A rare exception is the synthesis report on states without judicial councils compiled by Lord Thomas. 
See Councils for the Judiciary: States without a High Council (preliminary report), CCJE (2007) 4, 
Strasbourg, 19 March 2007.  
36 Different classifications are equally plausible. Our classification relies on Nicola Picardi, La Ministère 
de la Justice et les autres modèles d´administration de la justice en Europe, in L'INDIPENDENZA DELLA 
GIUSTIZIA, OGGI. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, TODAY: LIBER AMICORUM IN ONORE DI GIOVANNI E. LONGO (in Philippe 
Abravanel et al eds., 1999). 
 
The Ministry of Justice model is the oldest one. In this model, the Ministry of Justice 
plays a key role in both the appointment and promotion of judges and in the 
administration of courts and court management. This model is in place in Germany, 
Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland and other countries. One caveat must be added 
here. It is misleading to claim that judges themselves play no role in the appointment 
and promotion of judges or in the administration of courts and court management in 
this model and that the national Ministry of Justice controls all these processes 
unilaterally. In the ministerial model, it is also other bodies, such as the legislature, 
the President of a given country, judicial boards, the ombudsman or professional 
organizations, which often play a significant role or at least have their say as well. 
Moreover, crucial role in these systems is in fact played by presidents of appellate 
and supreme courts, who are consulted regarding judicial promotion, appointments 
and other key issues. Some of the appointments or promotions cannot even be 
carried out without their consent. Thus, albeit called the “Ministry of Justice model”, it 
does not mean that all is run exclusively by the executive. The strong criticism one 
may encounter with respect to this model in number of international documents 
and/or academic writings and which the proponents of the judicial council model 
often criticize with fervour is rather a parody of the Minister of Justice model that no 
longer exists in Europe.37  
 
The judicial council model is a model where an independent intermediary 
organization is positioned between the judiciary and the politically responsible 
administrators in the executive or the parliament. The judicial council is given 
significant powers primarily in appointing and promoting judges and/or in exercising 
disciplinary powers vis-à-vis judges. While judicial councils may also play a role in 
the areas of administration, court management and budgeting of the courts, these 
powers are only secondary to their competences relating to judges and personnel 
generally. Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Hungary (until 2011), Italy, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain can be said 
to belong to this group. However, as will be shown below, not all of these judicial 
councils meet the criteria of the JC “Euro-model”.38  
 
In contrast, in the court service model, the primary function of an independent 
intermediary organization is in the area of administration (supervision of judicial 
registry offices, case loads and case stocks, flow rates, the promotion of legal 
uniformity, quality care etc.), court management (housing, automation, recruitment, 
training, etc.) and the budgeting the courts. In contrast to judicial councils, the court 
services have a limited role in the appointment and promotion of judges and do not 
exercise disciplinary powers vis-à-vis judges. These powers are sometimes vested in 
independent organs such as judicial appointment commissions that operate 
separately from the court service. Denmark, Ireland, Norway and Sweden are 
examples of countries that have adopted the court service model. 
 
By hybrid models we mean any model that combines various components of the 
previous three models in such a way that it is significantly distinct from each of them. 
Hybrid models operate in England and Wales, Estonia, Hungary (since 2011), 
Iceland, Switzerland and in European micro-states. These models are so specific that 
one cannot generalize about them in order to create one clear box. They include 
judicial appointment commissions that deal only with the selection of judges up to a 
                                                          
37 What many critics attacked in the CEE was in fact the “state administration of courts”, which was 
based on the socialist model (which is discussed immediately below in this section) rather than the 
current Ministry of Justice model. 
38 Moreover, the classification of several judicial councils is open to debate. For instance, one may 
reasonably claim that the Dutch judicial council is in fact closer to the Court Service model.  
certain tier of the judicial system, whereas the rest of the court administration is 
vested in another organ (England and Wales); countries where the judicial council 
coexists with another strong nationwide body responsible for court administration 
(Hungary since 2011); countries where the Minister of Justice shares power with 
judges of the Supreme Court (Cyprus); federal countries where the court 
administration varies from one state to another (Switzerland); and micro-states that 
have peculiar systems of court administration tailored to their specific needs 
(Lichtenstein and Luxembourg).  
 
Finally, the socialist model of court administration concentrated the power over 
judges and the judicial system in general in three institutions – the General 
Prosecutor (procurator), the Supreme Court and court presidents – which are then, 
however, themselves controlled by the communist Party. In fact therefore, it is the 
Party controlling the courts through these institutions. Specific features of this model 
varied from one communist country to another and changed with time. The following 
mechanisms were nonetheless quite common: a residual power of the communist 
Party to dismiss judges who did not exercise judicial office in line with the Party 
policies; frequent retention reviews of judges; the relocation and demotion of judges 
without a decision of the disciplinary court; arbitrary assignment of cases by court 
presidents; the reassignment at will of judges within their courts or deciding on salary 
bonuses of judges; the Supreme Court could remove any case from the lower courts 
and decide it itself; and the General Prosecutor had the right to ask for the review of 
any judicial decision, including those that had already became final.39 The pure 
socialist model of court administration no longer exists in Europe.40 However, it is 
important to mention this model41 in the European context, as some of the post-
communist countries in CEE have still not got rid of all features of the socialist model. 
Even more importantly, in a number of these countries, the legacy of the omnipotent 
Supreme Court and court presidents is lasting until today. 
 
A quick glance at the models of court administration in Europe suggests that great 
number of current EU Member States have opted for the judicial council model. This 
does not, however, mean that all of them would have indeed taken on board and 
introduced the promoted JC Euro-model outlined above and advocated by the EU 
and the CoE. The composition, competences as well as the power of judicial councils 
vary considerably even among European countries that established some sort of 
judicial council and could thus be said to represent the judicial council model.42 Many 
of these judicial councils do not even meet the criteria of the Euro-model we 
identified above. For instance, French, Dutch and Portuguese judges are in the 
minority on the judicial councils in their countries. In Spain judicial members of the 
                                                          
39 For descriptions of the office of the Procurator and its functions in English, see e.g. GB SMITH, THE 
SOVIET PROCURACY AND THE SUPERVISION OF ADMINISTRATION (1978) or GG Morgan, SOVIET 
ADMINISTRATIVE LEGALITY: THE ROLE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE (1962). A comparative East/West 
assessment is offered in PUBLIC INTEREST PARTIES AND THE ACTIVE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 
(JA Jolowicz ed., 1974). 
40 Only the Belarusian model of court administration gets close. On the state of the Belarusian judiciary, 
see Alezander Vashkevich, Judicial Independence in the Republic of Belarus, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
IN TRANSITION 1065 (Anja Seibert-Fohr ed., 2012), in particular at 1068-1071, 1101-1103, 1109-1110 & 
1115-1118. However, the socialist model is still alive outside Europe, for instance in China; see e.g 
PETER H. SOLOMON, Authoritarian legality and informal practices: Judges, lawyers and the state in 
Russia and China, 43 COMMUNIST AND POST-COMMUNIST STUDIES 351 (2010); Xin He, Black Hole of 
Responsibility: The Adjudication Committee's Role in a Chinese Court, 46 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW 681 
(2012); Ling Li, The “Production” of Corruption in China’s Courts: Judicial Politics and Decision Making 
in a One-Party State, 37 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 848 (2012). 
41 Alternatively, we may perceive the socialist model of the administration of courts as a perverse 
version of the classic Ministry of Justice model. However, the merging of these two models into one 
would ignore important differences between them. 
42 For a helpful taxonomy of judicial councils, see Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 31, at 122. 
judicial council are not selected by their peers. In Belgium, Poland and Slovenia, 
judicial councils do not play any role in disciplining judges. Finally, the Hungarian 
Judicial Council met the requirements of the EU/CoE Judicial Council Model only 
until Orbán’s government passed the 2011 judicial reform that took many powers 
from the Hungarian High Council for the Judiciary (Magyar Köztársaság Bíróságai) 
and transferred them to the newly established National Judicial Office.43 
 
Therefore, the JC Euro-model is in fact only a subset of judicial councils that exist in 
Europe. The key feature that distinguishes the promoted Euro-model from its 
competing alternatives, including other types of judicial councils, is that it centralizes 
competences affecting virtually all matters of the career of judges at one place and 
grants control over this body to the judges. The Euro-model is built on the premise 
that judges are reliable, solid actors, who know their business and are able to 
administer it. It is therefore considered wise to insulate the judiciary from the 
democratic process.  
 
If we compare the Euro-model with the existing judicial councils in the EU Member 
States, it is evident that the Euro-model had been heavily inspired by the Italian 
judicial council rather than that one of France, Spain or Portugal. In the latter 
countries, the national Ministries of Justice have preserved some influence over 
judicial recruitment.44 Given the prominent position of Italians in the relevant Pan-
European bodies, the preference for absolute judicial autonomy does not come as a 
surprise. 
 
If we go global and look for world-wide alternative to the JC model, we find even 
greater variety of models of court administration. The JC model is widespread in 
Latin America, in part due to the pressure from international actors,45 but certainly 
also due to the influence of Latin Europe exercised in these countries. The executive 
models can be found in Canada or Japan. Hard-core socialist models of court 
administration exist in China, Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and still in many former 
Soviet republics. In addition to the five models of court administration we can find in 
Europe, peculiar models exist in many countries in the Middle-East, where religious 
institutions play a crucial role in judicial governance. In Africa, models of court 
administration are even more diverse, as they often combine the colonial legacies 
with local specifics. From the European perspective, even the United States’ model 
of court administration that puts a great emphasis on the democratic process, in 
particular by electing judges,46 represents a distinct model that does not have an 
equivalent in Europe.  
 
Finally, similarly to the JC Euro-model, the “global” JC model also argues for 
complete judicial control over court administration.47 The only difference is that the 
                                                          
43 The Hungarian model of court administration after the 2011 judicial reforms thus belongs to the 
category of “hybrid models”. 
44 Parau, supra note 12, at 643-644.  
45 See e.g. LA Hammergren, ENVISIONING REFORM: IMPROVING JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 
(2007); or J Couso, Judicial Independence in Latin America: The Lessons of History in the Search for an 
Always Elusive Ideal, in INSTITUTIONS & PUBLIC LAW: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES (T Ginsburg and RA 
Kagan, eds., 2005). 
46 Note that most U.S. judges on the state level are elected and often face regular retention review. In 
addition, non-Art III federal judges (such as magistrate judges, bankruptcy judges or administrative 
judges) are usually appointed for the specified terms of office and face additional forms of accountability. 
Only the so-called “Article III judges” (judges of district courts and circuit courts and Justices of the 
Supreme Court of the United States), the tiny minority of the U.S. judiciary, are appointed for life (by the 
U.S. Senate upon nomination of the President) and enjoy the full set of safeguards. In sum, the elected 
branches have a major say in the career of judges at all levels of the judicial hierarchy in the United 
States. 
47 See supra Section 2 (and in particular note 2). 
“global” JC model is less developed and perhaps less outspoken than its European 
counterpart.  
 
5) ONE SIZE FITS ALL? A CRITIQUE OF GLOBAL OR EURO-MODELS 
 
Based on the previous three subsections, we can start pinpointing some of the 
deficits of the Euro- or even “global” model of court administration. Five points of 
critique will be raised in this section, largely from a normative point of view. Some of 
these points of critique will be elaborated further on in the ensuing sections of this 
paper from an empirical point of view. 
 
First and foremost, the major objection to the Euro-model of court administration is 
that it suffers from the lack of democratic legitimacy. It disempowers elected 
branches of the government and transfers virtually all personal competences over 
judicial career to the judiciary. To paraphrase Roberto Unger, one of the little secrets 
of the Euro-model is its discomfort with democracy.48  
 
Moreover, the lack of output (content) legitimacy of the JC Euro-model can certainly 
not be substituted by its input (process) derived legitimacy.49 As has already been 
suggested,50 the process of setting the standards of a Euro-model of court 
administration is opaque. It side-steps democratic process and relies exclusively on a 
narrow group of judges and high-ranking officials of international and supranational 
bodies. The drafting process of reports of these bodies lacks openness and 
transparency. Other stakeholders can rarely comment on or influence the wording of 
the proposed standards. 
 
Even if one were to assume that such standards were to be drafted by judges only, 
the lack of input legitimacy is further exacerbated by the problem of representation. It 
has two dimensions: state-internal and trans-European. With respect to the former, it 
is questionable how far the judicial members of the current European or international 
consultative bodies really represent the national judiciaries as a whole and not rather 
the particular interests of a narrow group of court presidents and senior judges. One 
might even suggest, with a certain degree of simplification, that a narrow coterie of 
judicial officials meets few times a year in a closed session and once in a while 
announces a standard that defines the desired contours of their own power.  
 
With the respect to the latter, there is the trans-European representativeness 
problem within the consultative and advisory judicial bodies. How far and how 
strongly are the various judicial and legal cultures present within Europe indeed 
represented? To put it differently, why is it that the JC Euro-model so closely 
resembles the Italian model of judicial council? How was it possible that the Italian 
model found so widespread support among judges from other European states, and 
became in fact translated into a “Euro-model”? True, the Italian Consiglio superiore 
della magistratura (CSM) is one of the oldest judicial councils in Europe. It might 
therefore, arguably, enjoy a privileged status based on its seniority. However, the 
Italian CSM has also been repeatedly criticized for corporativism, a lack of judicial 
accountability and suboptimal efficiency, to say at least.51 One must thus search for 
                                                          
48 Roberto Unger, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME 72-73 (1998) or Jeremy Waldron, Dirty Little 
Secret 98 COLUM. L. REV. 510 (1998).  
49 For the discussion of this traditional distinction, see eg. E.g. FW SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: 
EFFECTIVE OR DEMOCRATIC 6-30 (1999) or FW Scharpf, Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity, 1 
EUROPEAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 173 (2009). 
50 Above, section 2. 
51 See e.g. C. GUARNIERI & P. PEDERZOLI, THE POWER OF JUDGES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COURTS AND 
DEMOCRACY 54-59 and 174-177 (2002); M. L. Volcansek, Judicial Selection in Italy: A Civil Service 
additional explanations. As one commentator suggested, the success of CSM as a 
European model 
“is also the result of the international presence and activism of the Consiglio 
superiore della magistratura and its members (it is not by chance that the ENCJ was 
formally established at the General Assembly of 20-21 May 2004 in Rome, and that 
[its] first President was Italian)”.52  
 
Second, the Euro-model ignores the worldwide rise of power of courts, which calls for 
greater accountability of judges, hardly for their increased insulation behind the veil of 
a fully self-administering judicial council. Furthermore, while l’esprit de corps and 
ethical standards may be higher in established democracies, it is not necessarily so 
in developing or transforming countries. Leaving the judiciary unchecked by external 
actors in the latter countries might easily lead to corruption and judicial accountability 
avoidance.53  
 
Third, even if we assume that the judiciary should even under such conditions be 
granted further autonomy, the Euro-model is not really able to deliver it with respect 
to individual judicial decision-making. It neglects the internal threats coming from 
within the judiciary. The Euro-model shields the judiciary from external influence, but 
it pays little attention to the improper pressure on individual judges exercised by 
senior judges and court presidents. It is important to remember that the judiciary is 
not “it” but “they”.54 The Euro-model empowers only a narrow group of judges who in 
turn may favour their allies and shape the judiciary according to their views.55 They 
may even use their newly accrued power to settle the score with their competitors, 
critics or opponents within the judiciary.56  
 
This is a significant failure of the JC Euro-model, which is embedded in its 
institutional design. The sixth criterion of the JC Euro-model we identified above57 
ought to be recalled at this stage: court presidents and vice-presidents are generally 
not precluded from becoming members of the judicial council. There is typically no 
set maximum number of these judicial officials among members of the judicial 
council. Similarly, the JC Euro-model does not set any limit on the number of senior 
judges of appellate and top courts that can sit in the judicial council. Thus, the judicial 
council need not to be representative of all echelons of the judicial hierarchy. This 
means that lower court judges may also elect appellate judges or court presidents as 
their representatives in the judicial council.  
 
As a result, court presidents may have a majority on the judicial council. The model 
previously advocated as “self-governance” of judges quickly becomes nothing else 
than unbounded administration by senior judicial officials. This is particularly troubling 
in the CEE region, where court presidents have strong powers within their courts (the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Model with Partisan Results, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 
FROM AROUND THE WORLD (K. Malleson & P. R. Russell eds., 2006) 159. 
52 Simone Benvenuti, The French and the Italian high councils for the judiciary Observations drawn from 
the analysis of their staff and activity (1947-2011), paper presented at 2012 IPSA World Congress, 8-12 
July 2012, at 2 (on file with authors). The strong influence of Italian and Latin-style judicial councils 
within the European structures and their ensuing ideological domination in elaborating common 
standards therein is further elaborated upon below in sections 4 and 8.  
53 On judicial accountability avoidance and other negative accountability phenomena, see D. Kosař, The 
Least Accountable Branch, 11 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 234, at 259-260 (2013). 
54 Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is A They, Not An It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy Of Division, 
14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2009). 
55 See Béla Pokol, Judicial Power and Democratization in Eastern Europe, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
CONFERENCE “EUROPEANISATIONS AND DEMOCRATISATION: THE SOUTHERN EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE AND THE 
PERSPECTIVE FOR THE NEW MEMBER STATES OF THE ENLARGED EUROPE (2005), 165, at 182 and 188. 
56 See the Slovak case study discussed in Section 8. 
57 Supra section 3.  
meso-level). If they are allowed to combine their powers at the meso-level with 
additional powers at the meta-level (within the judicial council), they accumulate 
considerable power within the judicial system.  
 
One might even wonder, with tongue-in-cheek, whether the silence of the JC Euro-
model regarding the selection of the representatives of the judiciary was not 
intentional. The Euro standards were created under the auspices of various 
consultative bodies of the EU and the CoE. In these bodies, national judiciaries are 
usually represented by the Supreme Court president or prominent appellate judges.58 
This narrow group of court presidents and senior judges would hardly be inclined to 
share or even to yield their own extant powers. When they advocated the transfer of 
the competences from the Ministry of Justice to the judiciary, what they likely had in 
mind was in fact the transfer of this power to them acting as the judicial council. That 
might explain why the Euro-model leaves such great latitude regarding the electoral 
laws of the judicial members of the judicial councils. Put differently, the sixth criterion 
of the JC Euro-model is its critical component.59 Without it, there might have been far 
less support for the JC Euro-model among judicial officials in power. 
 
Fourth, it is confusing or even suspicious that international and supranational bodies 
in which representatives of established democracies still have a major say advocate 
for the model of court administration that most established democracies themselves 
have been either reluctant to introduce so far or outright rejected. Thus, the already 
outlined lack of democratic legitimacy was further multiplied. Not only was the way in 
which such recommendations have been adopted at the international/European 
forum and their content highly problematic. In those established countries, where 
democratic control of the incoming international standards was possible, they were 
not taken on board. Thus, such standards could not have gained any further or 
substitute legitimacy through the national levels, by being embraced in established 
democracies and thus providing certain “leading by example” for the transforming 
countries.  
 
Fifth, the Euro-model is portrayed as an “off-the-rack” product that will produce the 
promised results in any environment. It does not take into account the specifics of 
each judicial system, its vices and virtues, the legal culture the relevant judiciary is 
embedded in and its historical legacies and path-dependency. In this sense, the 
Euro-model is unhistorical. 
 
However, in reply to such normative critique, a realist (or a cynic, depending on the 
individual definition of optimism) might suggest that in “going international” and 
projecting their own ideas and wishes onto the international forum, judges of the last 
few decades in fact just started copying the behaviour of national executives. The 
executive “escape” from the national parliamentary control towards the international 
or the European level is by now a well-known phenomenon in post-WWII Europe and 
beyond.60 In Europe and in particular within the European Union, it just reached 
quantitatively new dimensions. National governments, which are facing unpopular but 
                                                          
58 Supra section 2. 
59 We will explain how this electoral law, or its deficiencies, can influence the functioning of the judicial 
council in Section 8, where we discuss the Slovak case study. The mode of selection of judicial 
members had great consequences also on the operation of the Hungarian judicial council (before 
Orbán’s 2011 judicial reform) - see Pokol, supra note 55, at 188-189. 
60 Traditionally, governments do not have a strong record for willingly keeping the national parliaments 
informed about international affairs. Even if they inform national parliaments, the parliamentary control 
tends to be carried out only ex post and limited to the (non)ratification of treaties negotiated by the 
executive. Within the EU context, see e. g. NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS ON THEIR WAYS TO EUROPE: LOSERS OR 
LATECOMERS? (A. Maurer and W. Wessels eds., 2001) or John Fitzmaurice, National Parliamentary 
Control of EU policy in the Three New Member States 19 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 88 (1996).  
necessary measures to be taken on the national level, which would be either harmful 
to their reputation or could not be even pushed through the national parliament, take 
these issues to the European or international level. There they find sympathetic 
colleagues from other national administrations, frequently facing similar set of 
problems in their respective countries. After reaching a mutually beneficial agreement 
and adopting a new treaty or a new EU measure, they return to the national 
constituency with the impenetrable argument “Brussels wills it” in case of a EU 
measure and with reference to “our international obligations” with respect to 
international treaties.  
 
Thus, is there anything that surprising or strange with judges starting copying the 
same behaviour as the national administrations? Both of them are at odds with 
democracy and accountability, the national governments perhaps less than judges. 
This development may not necessarily mean that judges would immediately become 
an “international priesthood” which would seek to “impose upon our free and 
independent citizens supra-national values that contradict their own”.61 On the 
international level, judges meet in public. The outcomes of the meetings are known 
and published. At the same time, however, there is indeed a qualitative leap: judges 
became an internationally organized force.62  
 
6) PROMOTING THE EURO-MODEL IN THE NEW EUROPE  
 
The story of the importation of the judicial council Euro-model of court administration 
into the New Europe (i.e. the post-communist countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe and partially also post-Soviet legal space) is one of indirect, diagonal law 
exportation through “Europe”. The JC model has been exported through the 
European institutions and marketed as the “Euro-solution” for the judicial reform 
across the CEE. The puzzling question is how was it possible that a model of a 
strong and insulated judicial council, which might be said to generate certainly less 
than optimal results in terms of judicial performance in the countries of its origin,63 
has been able to became the dominant and in fact the “Euro-model” pushed forward 
and advocated by the European institutions?  
 
There are several factors which were crucial in this marketing success: structural as 
well as circumstantial. Structurally speaking, genuine reform and transformation is a 
lengthy and tiresome process.64 It is therefore not much favoured by national or 
international political actors, who wish for visible and quick solutions. What tends to 
be preferred is the establishment of a new, grand institution than the reform of the old 
one(s). In terms of a judicial reform, a new national council of the judiciary as the 
symbol of a new era might certainly be politically more visible and internationally 
                                                          
61 Antonin Scalia, Commentary 40 ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL 1119, at 1122 (1995-1996) 
62 The buzzword of the last 10 years or so in Europe is “judicial networks” – see recently e.g. Monica 
Claes & Maartje de Visser, Are You Networked Yet? On Dialogues in European Judicial Networks, 8 
UTRECHT LAW REVIEW 100 (2012) or ALEXIS LE QUINIO, RECHERCHE SUR LA CIRCULATION DES SOLUTIONS 
JURIDIQUES: LE RECOURS AU DROIT COMPARE PAR LES JURIDICTIONS CONSTITUTIONNELLES 179-187 (2011). See 
also AWH Meij, Circles of Coherence: On Unity of Case-Law in the Context of Globalisation, 6 
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW 84 (2010).  
63 See. e.g. the critical voices on the state and performance of the Italian CSM quoted supra, note 51. 
The same model has delivered rather questionable results also in Latin America, see supra, note 45.  
64 The question is also when it is over, if ever. A legal transformation may be conceived of at different 
levels. In the narrow sense, it just means the shift from one regime to another, a mere change in the 
constitutional structure. In the broader sense, it means much more: not just a constitutional shift, but 
also change in values, their enforcement and the real life of the new institutions. See eg: CSABA VARGA, 
TRANSITION TO RULE OF LAW: ON THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION IN HUNGARY 74 (1995). Varga quotes 
the former president of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, L Sólyom, who claimed that for him, the 
“transition” was, from the legal point of view, finished in October 1989. From then on, Hungary has been 
a law-governed state and there is no further stage to transit to.  
better to check as a sign of “progress” than the tedious small scale work on the 
ground, such as for instance issues of work management, auxiliary court staff, 
systems of random case assignment, publicly accessible online search engines of 
national case law, reasonable judicial performance evaluation etc.  
 
This is not to suggest that these two issues (macro and micro scale reform) are not 
connected. What is rather suggested is that once the “grand design” in the form of a 
new umbrella institution of a judicial council has been created, the appropriate box on 
the international compliance sheet has been ticked off. This invariably meant, in 
terms of judicial reform in the CEE, that once a new judicial council based on the best 
Euro-standards has been established, the “mission accomplished” flag was flung. 
Attention has quickly moved to other policy areas and other institutions. However, as 
evidenced in a number of countries in the CEE, the real problems were just about to 
start.  
 
Structural preference for institutional novelty to the detriment of genuine internal 
reform met with ideal circumstantial conditions, both external as well as internal. 
Internally, those in favour of a partial or full self-administration of the judiciary by the 
fiat of a judicial council tend to be judges themselves, in particular senior judges. 
Their suggestion would often be supported by non-governmental organizations as 
well as parts of legal scholarship. On the other hand, politicians and administrators 
tend not to welcome the idea of a self-administering judiciary. However, in systems of 
transition, their voices tend to be weakened, especially if external pressure is being 
put on them.65 The pressure was particularly strong in the EU pre-accession stage. 
Potential national political disagreement was considerably weakened by the EU 
conditionality and the “alliance of interests” in favour of the establishment of robust 
judicial councils was the strongest. The national judicial, non-governmental and 
academic demands were boosted by external support: governmental as well as non-
governmental.  
 
On the governmental level, both the CoE as well as the EU were, in terms of 
standards, suggesting the introduction of the judicial council Euro-model as the 
model for the transition countries in the CEE.66 This overall and general “soft” 
suggestion as to the best practice started becoming a de facto requirement with 
respect to the CEE candidate countries for the EU membership. In 1993, in so-called 
Copenhagen criteria,67 the EU set a number of conditions a candidate country must 
fulfil in order to become a new Member State of the EU. The first of the criteria 
required that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities.68  
 
The Copenhagen criteria were later fleshed out in Agenda 2000.69 Therein, the 
European Commission announced that it would report regularly to the European 
                                                          
65 Many scholars have been perplexed about why the CEE parliaments gave up their power so easily; 
see e.g. Cristina Parau, The Dormancy of Parliaments: The Invisible Cause of Judiciary Empowerment 
in Central and Eastern Europe, forthcoming in REPRESENTATION – JOURNAL OF REPRESENTATIVE 
DEMOCRACY (2013), on file with the authors. 
66 In detail above, section 2.  
67 European Council in Copenhagen 21-22 June 199, Conclusions of the Presidency (SN 180/1/93 REV 
1) 13.  
68 Generally see e.g. Kochenov, supra note 18, or Kirstyn Inglis, EU enlargement: membership 
conditions applied to future and potential Member States, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS NEIGHBOURS: 
LEGAL APPRAISAL OF THE EU'S POLICIES OF STABILISATION, PARTNERSHIP AND INTEGRATION (Steven 
Blockmans & Adam Lazowski eds., 2006).  
69 Agenda 2000 - Vol. I: For a stronger and wider Union (COM/97/2000 final) and Vol. II: The challenge 
of enlargement (COM/97/2000 final).  
Council on progress made by each of the candidate CEE countries in preparations 
for membership and that it would submit its first Report at the end of 1998. 
Requirements as to the quality of the judicial system in the candidate countries were 
included under the heading “democracy and the rule of law”. One of the clearly stated 
requirements included in the Commissions regular monitoring reports was the 
“independence and self-government of the judiciary”.70  
 
The message sent from the European institutions in this respect was quite clear: if 
you wish to join the “Euro club”, you ought to introduce (at least some features of) 
self-government of the judiciary.71 This external pressure and conditionality was also 
amplified by a further set of international actors, which could be perhaps aptly 
labelled as the international “rule-of-law-industry”. They would include a 
heterogeneous set of non-governmental organizations, development agencies and 
international scholars who would invariably also push for the establishment of judicial 
self-administration in the form of a judicial council. A notable example from this set of 
actors with respect to the EU candidate countries in late 1990 and early 2000 would 
for instance represent the Open Society Institute. It compiled a series of comparative 
reports on the state of judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe, inter alia 
reprimanding those countries who would not have adopted self-administration of 
courts.72  
 
However, while it is open to debate which of the two factors, external or internal, 
played the key role in a given CEE country, it is clear that some domestic actors 
greeted the JC Euro-model with open arms. External pressure met with partial 
internal demand. Several scholars have even suggested that domestic judicial 
institutions, rather than supranational influences, have been the major factor in 
judicial policymaking and agenda-setting in this region. For instance, Daniela Piana 
argues in her book dealing with judicial governance in five post-communist countries 
in CEE (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) that those 
actors (the Ministry of Justice or the Judicial Council) who emerged as winners from 
the first transitional wave of reforms were better placed in the second pre-accession 
wave. They accordingly exploited the opportunities provided by the looming EU 
accession to entrench existing domestic allocations of powers.73 These winners used 
their leverage from the first transition wave to increase their own powers or at least to 
prevent the transferral of significant powers to other organs. Cristina Parau puts forth 
a different argument,74 but she also posits that supranational origin of the JC Euro-
                                                          
70 See. e.g. European Commission’s Regular Report On Czech Republic’s Progress Towards Accession 
- the 2001 report published on 13 November 2001 as SEC (2001) 1746, 18-20 or the 2002 report 
published on 9 October 2002, document no. SEC (2002) 1402, 22-24.  
71 I.e. mostly in the period before the EU Accession. The two new Member States which joined the EU in 
2007, Romania and Bulgaria, represent in this respect a special case of de-facto extending the pre-
accession conditionality to the period after the Accession. However, also in these countries, the EU´s 
input has been crucial. Cf. e.g. Diana Bozhilova, Measuring Success and Failure of EU-Europeanization 
in the Eastern Enlargement: Judicial Reform in Bulgaria, 9 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REFORM 285 
(2007). Parau, supra note 12, at 655 states that: “Ironically, it was the Commission who imposed on 
Romania the formal institutions designed to autonomise the Romanian judiciary. Without such pressure 
it is highly unlikely that the SCM would have been given so much power and autonomy: ‘[t]he 2004 
reform would probably not have happened without pressure from the Commission and pressures 
associated with wanting to join the EU [...] Or it might have taken longer, it might not have followed the 
same path [...] The European Commission was strongly associated with it’.” 
72 Cf. Open Society Institute comprehensive report Judicial Independence (Central European University 
Press 2001), accessible online at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/monitoring-eu-
accession-process-judicial-independence, for instance with respect to the Czech Republic (Judicial 
Independence in the Czech Republic), at 112-113 and 127-128.  
73 Piana, supra note 20, at 162-163. 
74 Parau, supra note 65. See also or Cristina Parau, Explaining judiciary governance in Central and 
Eastern Europe: external incentives, transnational elites and Parliament inaction, forthcoming in 
EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES (2013), on file with the authors. 
model does not adequately explain the success of their design template. She argues 
that an equally important but far less observable cause for their success was the 
'dormancy' of the CEE parliaments. In particular, it was the puzzling lack of 
resistance by the majority of elected representatives to their own correlative 
disempowerment.75 
 
Against such supranational as well as domestic demand for a new institution for the 
judiciary, the Latin-styled Judicial Council model clearly emerged as “the” model for 
the CEE countries. The imposition of this model through the European institutions yet 
again confirms the fact that as with respect to any marketing or exportation, the 
product which in the end sells is not necessarily the best one in terms of quality, but 
the product which has good marketing. In contrast to other models of judicial 
administration,76 the advantage of the Latin-styled judicial council model is that fact 
that it presents an advanced structure with dedicated force to the entertaining of 
“foreign relations” within the national judicial council structures. The model is thus 
much better able to “reproduce” itself internationally. In the words of the already 
introduced marketing parallel, there is an in-house (international) “sales department”. 
One may only contrast this with the (Germanic) Ministry of Justice model or the much 
more restrained and pragmatic quality-oriented court services model in the north of 
Europe, which do not dispose of means and tools for self-propagation on the 
international level. In other words, such models are arguably more concerned with 
internal quality and efficiency than with entertaining flamboyant external relations.77  
 
Thus, in contrast to the complex variety of national models of administration of 
judiciary extant across Europe, the Latin-style judicial council model provided an 
ideal off-the-rack and ready-made product available at the right place in the right 
time. Apart from this, the model was also alluring in its seemingly elegant simplicity: a 
clear cut new institution will be introduced whose task it to redress the deficiencies of 
the previous model. Before entering into the discussion of the genuine life and 
sociological impact of judicial councils in CEE, a glance at the (normative) promise of 
what the model was supposed to deliver in the first place is nonetheless necessary.  
 
7) WHAT WAS THE EURO-MODEL SUPPOSED TO DELIVER? 
 
If we want to identify the goals the JC Euro-model was supposed to achieve, we 
must search through the documents of the Council of Europe and the European 
Union. Two caveats must be added at the very beginning. First, it goes without 
saying that goals set by “founding fathers” and advocates of the JC Euro-model may 
somewhat differ from the actual effects of this model. Some sort of standard 
functional deviation is thus inevitable, certainly in short or mid-term. It is clear, 
however, that if the ensuing reality of a model denies its founding values and 
promises completely, one can hardly talk of any permissible deviation or modification. 
Second, in our search for the effects of the introduction of the Euro-model, we focus 
only on institutional and personal consequences for the judiciary and judges. We thus 
leave aside the potential impact of this model on various values external to the 
judiciary such as “the rule of law, civil liberties, individual freedoms [and] basic 
                                                          
75 In Slovakia, which is covered neither by Piana’s nor Parau’s research and which we discuss in more 
detail below (section 8), the internal factors prevailed too. The major rationale for the introduction of the 
JC Euro-model in Slovakia was “anti-Mečiarism”. The period of “mečiarism” refers to years between 
1992 and 1998, when Vladimír Mečiar was the Prime Minister of Slovakia. Mečiar was known for his 
autocratic style of government. In 1998, after the democratic centrist coalition won the general elections, 
it wanted to ensure that “Mečiar-style interferences” with the judiciary could not be repeated. In order to 
prevent these interferences, the centrist coalition founded a new institution – the Judicial Council of the 
Slovak Republic that meets all the criteria of the Euro-model. 
76 Outlined above, section 4.  
77 See also supra, text to notes 51-52.  
human rights”.78 This is intentional: important and grandiose as these values are, 
they are also either contested terms and/or so vague that they are in practice 
impossible to measure to any reasonable degree.79  
 
We can therefore narrow down the question to be answered in this section as 
follows: which values or characteristics of the judiciary was the introduction of the 
Euro-model supposed to enhance? There is one particular value which stands out in 
the policy documents produced under the auspices of the CoE and the EU: judicial 
independence. In fact, virtually all the documents of these two bodies claim that the 
JC model improves judicial independence.80 Unfortunately, none of these documents 
spell out what they mean by judicial independence. They usually acknowledge the 
difference between the independence of individual judges and the independence of 
the judiciary and claim that judicial councils enhance both of these facets of judicial 
independence.81 It would appear nonetheless that the documents clearly prioritize 
the latter aspect: the autonomy of the judiciary.82  
 
Other potential values or goals of the JC model are mentioned far less frequently. As 
early as in 1994, the CoE stressed the importance of the efficiency of judges.83 Later 
on, both the Council of Europe and the European Union contended that the JC model 
improves the efficiency of the judiciary.84 In fact, speeding up judicial procedures and 
reducing workloads became a mantra of the EU Accession Reports. Eventually, the 
quality of justice was added as a separate value, which the JC model is also 
supposed to deliver.85  
 
Surprisingly, much less attention has been paid, until very recently, to other generally 
acceptable values such as transparency, participation, and accountability. Regarding 
transparency, during the accession process, the European Commission was 
preoccupied with judicial independence and the efficiency of the judiciary and side-
lined transparency mechanisms.86 So did the CoE.87 Recently, both of these 
                                                          
78 See e.g. ENCJ Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, § 1.2 in fine. 
79 See e.g. Tom Ginsburg, Pitfalls of Measuring the Rule of Law, 3 HAGUE JOURNAL ON THE RULE OF LAW 
269 (2011) or Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept? 21 LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY 137 (2002) (regarding the rule of law). These challenges apply, mutatis mutandis, to other 
values mentioned in the ENCJ Report.  
80 See ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, para. 1.7; CCJE, Opinion no. 10 (2007), 
para. 8; Budapest Resolution, para. 1; European Charter on the Statute for Judges, para. 1.3; and 
Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: 
independence, efficiency and responsibilities, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 November 
2010, para. 26. 
81 See CCJE, Opinion no. 10 (2007), para. 8; or Recommendation CM/Rec (2010) 12 of the Committee 
of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities, adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 17 November 2010, para. 26. 
82 See e.g. ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, para. 2.2; CCJE, Opinion no.10 (2007), 
paras. 12-13; or Recommendation CM/Rec (2010) 12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states 
on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 
November 2010, para. 4. 
83 See Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (94) 12, 13 October 1994, printed in: 37 
YEARBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 453 (1994). 
84 See Budapest Resolution, para. 1; ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, para. 1.7; 
CCJE, Opinion no.10 (2007), para. 10; or Recommendation CM/Rec (2010) 12 of the Committee of 
Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities, adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 17 November 2010, para. 26.  
85 See ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, para. 1.7; CCJE, Opinion no.10 (2007), 
para. 10. 
86 Cf. in particular the pre-Accession Reports with respect to the individual CEE countries, put together 
by the European Commission, quoted supra notes 69 and 70.  
87 See e.g. Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (94) 12, 13 October 1994, printed in: 37 
YEARBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 453 (1994); or European Charter on the 
Statute for Judges, Strasbourg, 8-10 July 1998 (which do not mention transparency at all). 
international organizations have stressed the importance of transparency in their 
documents on judicial councils.88 They nonetheless still tend to focus on the 
transparency of the judicial council itself and not on the transparency of the 
judiciary.89 Participation has undergone similar development. The EU and the CoE, 
after initial reluctance, relaxed their position on the composition of the judicial council 
and accepted the parity between judges and non-judges.90  
 
What is most striking, given the well-known problems of venality of CEE judiciaries 
and their low ethical standards, is how little attention the EU and the CoE paid to 
judicial accountability. The relevant policy documents that define the JC Euro-model 
do not mention this value at all, despite the fact that judicial accountability has 
gradually emerged as the second most important goal of judicial councils in the 
scholarly literature (competing with judicial independence).91 The relevant policy 
documents focus on (limited) accountability of the judicial council instead of 
accountability of the judiciary and/or individual judges,92 or make clear that “the 
accountability of the judiciary can in no way call into question the independence of 
the judge when making judicial decisions”.93  
 
The fact that not a single document of the consultative organs of the CoE and the EU 
produced over the years sets standards regarding how judicial councils and self-
administrating judiciaries ought to addresses corruption of judges is also quite telling. 
All in all, the values promoted and goals set deeply reflect the way in which the 
standards were created: by (senior) judges and for (largely also senior) judges. Thus, 
great attention is being paid to institutional and power-enhancing elements, whereas 
somewhat meagre attention has been paid to the less comfortable but for the 
functional judiciary extremely important “house-keeping” elements.  
 
In sum, the declared “general mission”94 of the JC Euro-model has been to safeguard 
and enhance judicial independence, which was primary viewed in its macro- or 
institutional dimension. Besides judicial independence, the Euro-model was also 
supposed to, according to its “founding fathers”, deliver the following “goods”: (1) to 
increase the efficiency of the judicial system; (2) to enhance the quality of justice; (3) 
to depoliticize the judiciary; and, according to most recent documents, also (4) to 
increase the transparency of the judicial system.  
 
8) WHAT DID THE EURO-MODEL IN FACT DELIVER? 
 
Stated in a nutshell, the constitutional independence of the judicial power in the form 
of a judicial council might work in case of mature political environments, where 
decent ethical standards extant and embedded in the judiciary guarantee that the 
elected or appointed judges-administrators will put the common good before their 
                                                          
88 See e.g. ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, paras. 1.7 and 7.2; or Budapest 
Resolution, in fine. 
89 See CCJE, Opinion no. 10 (2007), Part VI; or ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, 
para. 2.5.  
90 Compare the most recent documents (e.g. ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, para. 
2.2; or Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: 
independence, efficiency and responsibilities, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 November 
2010, para. 27) that accept “only” 50% of judicial members in the judicial council with older documents 
that claim that “a substantial majority of the members should be judges” (e.g. CCJE, Opinion no.10 
(2007), para. 18). 
91 See Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 31, at 110.  
92 See CCJE, Opinion no. 10 (2007), Part VI. But cf. ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-
2011, para. 2.2.  
93 Budapest Resolution, para. 10. 
94 CCJE, Opinion no.10 (2007), title of Part II.  
own. However, the same constitutional insulation of the judicial power in countries in 
transition in the New Europe has been either awkward or had outright disastrous 
consequences for judicial independence and for the state and reform of judiciaries in 
general in these countries.  
 
Judicial self-administration in the form of a judicial council is based on the (in general 
understandable) assumption that the more senior members of the profession have 
more experience. They should thus be better administrators. The institutional design 
of the judicial councils is such as to bring the more senior members of the judiciary to 
the fore; either directly, making some senior judges ex lege members of the JC (chief 
justice, presidents of other supreme court etc.), or indirectly, by election.  
 
However, in transitional societies, which experience value discontinuity, there always 
is an inherent discrepancy between experience and values. Those with experience 
will typically adhere to the old system and other values. Senior judges will be 
inherited from the communist regime. Given the lack of purges within the judiciary 
and the shortage of judges after the fall of communist regimes, the number of judges 
from the communist era is particularly high at the higher echelons of the CEE 
judiciaries. One may speak of an “inverse pyramid”. As Zdeněk Kühn put it, “the 
higher one goes in the structure of the judiciary, the higher the percentage of ex-
communists”.95 
 
It is hard to imagine that communist-bred judges turning overnight into independent 
and responsible judicial managers, who are willing to put the good of the justice 
system before their own. However, once a national self-administrative body of the 
judiciary is established quite soon after the regime change, it is precisely the 
communist-grown judges who, because of their standing and seniority, will be given 
the key positions in the new institutional set-up.  
 
In the practice in the CEE countries which introduced the JC Euro-model,96 this 
scenario kept repeating itself. Judicial councils and the self-administration of the 
judiciary came simply too early, before much or genuine structural reform and above 
all the (natural) renewal of judges could take place. Once established, the senior 
(Communism-inherited) judicial cadres took over, either halting or sometimes even 
reversing the reforms already carried out. However, this time around, the political 
process cannot say much in this respect, because the show is run by a 
constitutionally entrenched judicial council.  
 
The resulting picture is negative. It just differs in the degree: from somewhat silly, but 
in their nature harmless “cargo cults” of judicial independence,97 which still hide some 
                                                          
95 Zdeněk Kühn, The Democratization and Modernization of Post-communist Judiciaries, in CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPE AFTER TRANSITION (Alberto Febbrajo & Wojciech Sadurski eds., 2010) 177, at 181. 
96 Note that not all CEE countries adopted the JC Euro-model. For instance, the Czech Republic 
retained its Ministry of Justice model. However, the Czech Republic is not alone. Some countries that 
introduced the judicial council model did not opt for the JC Euro-model. For instance, Poland never 
transferred virtually all powers regarding the career of judges to its National Council of the Judiciary 
(NCJ) and, moreover, in 2007 it banned court presidents from membership in the NCJ - see Adam 
Bodnar & Lukasz Bojarski, Judicial Independence in Poland, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 667 
(Anja Seibert-Fohr ed., 2012) 669-679. Estonia also preferred the co-operative model of court 
administration, where judicial councils share many powers with the Ministry of Justice - see Timo Ligi, 
Judicial Independence in Estonia, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 739 (Anja Seibert-Fohr ed., 
2012) 741-755. In contrast, Slovakian, Romanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian (until Orban’s judicial 
reforms in 2011) judicial councils are examples of the JC Euro-model. 
97 Cargo cult is a well-known metaphor of natives, who do not understand much of the content of an 
activity they have seen before being carried out by the more advanced societies, but keep mimicking it 
in the hope it might produce the desired effects. It has been used for describing some areas of (social) 
science, which allegedly instead of producing real science just play at it (see famously RF Feynman, 
promise of becoming functional and indeed independent system one day, to judicial 
councils turning into mafia-like structures of judges seeking personal gain and using 
the new institutional structure for power oppression.  
 
The fact that the Euro-model for the creation of the “right” form of a judicial council 
came with just the institutional skeleton and little or no internal flesh, was 
understandable and to certain degree predictable. Law importation is typically limited 
to the importation of the structure, hardly to simultaneous importation of its internal 
culture and conventions.98 What is being exported is the institutional exoskeleton, not 
the flesh which in the end indeed forms the genuine life of the institution. There was, 
however, a further problem with the skeleton itself: the institutional structure created 
and recommended99 has in fact no genuine equal in the national states themselves.  
 
How could a model be so strongly recommended if it in fact had no genuine parallel 
in reality? The point to remember in this respect is the way in which the 
recommended Euro-model was created, described in the previous sections of this 
article: it was by national judges meeting in various European and national fora and 
conjuring a model which they themselves would like. Such a model, apart from the 
obvious normative problems associated with its creation,100 is also flawed from a 
functional point of view. The end product is in fact a mélange of judicial wishes “this 
is the way we would love to have it, if ever anybody in our national state agreed to it”. 
However, the model itself was never genuinely tested in any real legal environment.  
 
Said by a metaphor, all this resembles the situation in which a curious tourist from 
Eastern Europe visits a shop in say Munich and wishes to buy a pair of shoes. She 
has heard a lot positive about the quality of German products and thus is ready to 
invest a bit more money in order to obtain the real German “Qualität”. However, only 
after having brought the new shiny shoes home, she discovers the little label well 
hidden on the inside of the shoe stating “Made in China”. After wearing the shoes for 
about a week, an unpleasant rash starts spreading around her heels. Enquiring with 
the producer of the shoes as to the genuine nature and composition of the product, 
she discovers that what she bought is in fact series of experimental design with new 
type of untested dyestuff and materials used. 
 
The same metaphor applies to the type of exportation of the JC Euro-model to the 
CEE countries. A model being marketed under the patronage of European 
institutions with a political sticker “Made in Europe” should more correctly bear the 
title “Made in Latin Europe”, or rather “Health Warning: Untested – Made by Judges 
for Judges”. It indeed remains the unhistorical “what if” question how many of the 
countries in New Europe would be lured by the new institution if being correctly told 
from the outset “adopt this model and your judiciary will become as reliable and 
efficient as the Italian judiciary”, instead of “you must adopt this in order to be 
“Europeans””. With respect to the latter option, it has been fascinating to see how, 
through the intermediary of various European and other institutions, judicial wishes, 
typically put together in a sort of soft-law instrument, became a de facto the binding 
norm.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Cargo Cult Science 37 (7) ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE 10, at 11 (1974)). The current practice of an 
independent judicial council function resembles such cargo cult: there is an empty shell and a number of 
confused natives who, without having much of internal culture and understanding, play at a serious and 
independent judicial institution. 
98 Further see MICHAL BOBEK, COMPARATIVE REASONING IN EUROPEAN SUPREME COURTS 255 ff. (2013) 
99 See in particular the judicial council model envisaged by ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 
2010-2011; and CCJE, Opinion no. 10 (2007). 
100 Above section 5. 
These factors account for the emergence of cargo cults with respect to the newly 
established judicial councils in transition countries in the CEE. Unfortunately, there 
might also be more pathological developments within such a new institution, in which 
senior judicial cadres coming from the communist period are given the chief say. This 
may even amount to certain “hijacking” of the new institution by the old communist 
judicial elites, and sealing it off behind a veil of judicial independence. 
 
The Slovak National Judicial Council might be a sad example at hand in this 
respect.101 In 2001, Slovakia opted for the JC Euro-model following the fall of the 
autocratic Mečiar’s government. The Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic 
(“JCSR”) is a body with constitutional standing.102 It is composed of 18 members: 8 
judges are elected from within the judiciary, 3 members are elected by the Slovak 
Parliament, 3 members are appointed by the President of the Slovak Republic and 3 
members are appointed by the Government. The last (or, more precisely, the first) 
member of the JCSR, which is at the same time ex lege its chairman, is the President 
of the Slovak Supreme Court. In practice, professional judges were always in the 
majority in the JCSR. The “first” JCSR (2002-2007) was composed of 12 judges and 
6 non-judges. The “second” JCSR (2008-2013) even consists of 16 judges and 2 
non-judges.103 This shows how important it is to decide who selects judicial members 
of the judicial council and how the electoral law to the judicial council is designed.104 
 
The importation of this new Euro-model has nonetheless not been matched by any 
visible rise in efficiency of the judiciary or the quality of justice. Depoliticization of the 
Slovak judiciary was also a rather wishful thinking. Every election of the JCSR’s 
chairman led to protracted constitutional litigation that attracted comments from all 
segments of the Slovak political scene. The new regime also allowed judges to 
become ministers without losing judicial office. Mr. Štefan Harabin exploited this 
option in 2006, when he became the Minister of Justice. In 2007, judges avowedly 
called for and accepted nominations to the JCSR from politicians. The election of the 
new president of the Supreme Court in 2008-2009 became a political theatre. 
However, the politicization of the judiciary reached its apex in 2010, when centrist 
parties won the parliamentary elections. The new government had little 
understanding for Harabin’s methods and the war between the Minister of Justice, 
Mrs. Lucia Žitňanská, and Mr. Harabin, broke out. Not a single week passed without 
ferocious attacks waged by Harabin,105 especially when Žitňanská announced her 
judicial reform that was supposed to reduce the influence of the president of the 
Supreme Court and the JCSR on the Slovak judiciary. On the other hand, Harabin’s 
critics have been also very vocal. But all sides had one thing in common – they 
wanted to get as much support as possible from their political allies. Hence, the 
JCSR gradually brought the judiciary to the forefront of the Slovak politics rather than 
insulating it from political tumult. 
 
                                                          
101 We do not intend to provide a deep level empirical study of the impact of the JCSR on the Slovak 
judiciary. However, we believe that the ensuing snapshot at what has been happening after the 
introduction of the JCSR clearly support the main arguments of our article.  
102 Art. 141a of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and related legislation, especially zákon č. 
185/2002 Z. z., o Súdnej rade Slovenskej republiky (Law no. 185/2002 Coll., on the Judicial Council of 
the Slovak Republic).  
103 Nominally at least 9 members must be judges; in practice, however, even the other institutions 
appoint judges as members of the JCSR.  
104 See supra Section 5, text to notes 57-59.  
105 For instance, he referred to Žitňanská as a “liar”. See Günter Woratsch, Zpráva o stavu slovenské 
justice – fenomén Štefan Harabin, Pecs, 23 April 2011 (hereinafter the “Woratsch Report”). 
Similarly, the JCSR did little for enhancing transparency of the Slovak judiciary.106 
Appointment as well as promotion of judges remained as opaque as under the 
Ministry of Justice model. It became perhaps even more nepotistic than before. The 
access to judicial decision did not improve until the Ministry of Justice, not the JCSR, 
started to publish online all decisions of district and regional courts in civil and 
commercial law cases in 2006 and passed through the law that required online 
publication of all judgments of Slovak courts in 2011.107 To the contrary, the JCSR 
rather hindered transparency. The JCSR has been accused of per rollam voting,108 
secretiveness, and holding its meetings in awkward locations that dissuaded the 
public and journalists from attending them.  
 
The impact of introducing the JCSR on the public confidence of the Slovak judiciary 
was even more negative. To be fair, the situation was far from being bright in 2002, 
when the JCSR started to operate. The results of the 2002 Transparency 
International poll speak of themselves: 60% respondents stated that corruption at 
courts and prokuratura existed and was widespread; 25% respondents stated that 
corruption at courts and prokuratura existed but they did not know how widespread it 
was; and only 1% stated that corruption at courts and prokuratura did not exist.109 At 
that time, it was generally thought that the judiciary reached its bottom during 
Mečiar’s rule and that the situation could not get any worse.  
 
However, after nine years of the functioning of JCSR, the confidence in the judiciary 
reached its lowest ebb ever in the Slovak history. The 2011 poll of the Institute for 
Public Affair, which provided separate results for three categories of respondents – 
lay people, legal experts and judges – shows the deleterious impact of the JC Euro-
model. As to lay people, 35% respondents trusted the Supreme Court of Slovakia 
and only 26% respondents trusted the judiciary as a whole,110 whereas 59% did not 
trust the Supreme Court and 70% did not trust the judiciary.111 The judiciary ranked 
last among all public institutions. The view of experts was similar regarding the 
judiciary, but it differed significantly as to the Supreme Court. While 21% experts 
trusted the judiciary, only 10% trusted the Supreme Court. The level of distrust vis-à-
vis the judiciary was very high (79%), but the distrust of the Supreme Court reached 
an astonishing number (86%).112 What is most shocking is the view of judges 
themselves. Only 68% respondent judges trusted the judiciary, whereas 32% 
indicated that they did not trust the Slovak courts.113 The results of the poll regarding 
the Supreme Court are even more revealing. As many as 54% judges in the survey 
responded that they did not trust the Supreme Court, while only 46% indicated that 
                                                          
106 See e.g. Jana Dubovcová, Umožňuje súčasný stav súdnictva zneužívanie disciplinárneho konania 
voči sudcom, zneužívanie výberových konaní a dáva výkonnej moci oprávnenie zasiahnuť do súdnej 
moci?, in VÝZVY SLOVENSKÉHO SÚDNICTVA A MOŽNOSTI ZLEPŠENIA EXISTUJÚCEHO STAVU 50 (Transparency 
International Slovensko ed., 2010), 53-56; LUKASZ BOJARSKI & WERNER STEMKER KÖSTER, THE SLOVAK 
JUDICIARY: ITS CURRENT STATE AND CHALLENGES (2011), at 94 & 107-109; or the Woratsch Report, supra 
note 105. 
107 See Art. 82a of Law No. 757/2004 Z. z., on Courts, as amended by Law No. 33/2011 Z. z. and Law 
No. 467/2011 Z. z. 
108 Voting done by the so called “per rollam” (by letter) means that it is a voting without calling a meeting 
(e.g. by correspondence), which meant that nobody could attend the JCSR’s meetings. 
109 Katarína Staroňová, Projekt “Súdný manažment” ako protikorupčný nástroj, in JEDENÁSŤ STATOČNÝCH: 
PRÍPADOVÉ STUDIE PROTIKORUPČNÝCH NÁSTROJOV NA SLOVENSKU 215 (Emília Sičáková-Beblavá & Miroslav 
Beblavý eds., 2008), at 217 (quoting the Transparency International Slovakia poll from 2004). 
110 Note that the Constitutional Court of Slovakia is not considered to be a part of the system of general 
courts in Slovakia and thus it was not covered by this question. 
111 Institute for Public Affairs (IVO): Slovenská justícia očami verejnosti, odborníkov a sudcov, 2011, at 
1. Note that the remaining responses (up to 100%) was “I do not know”. 
112 Id. at 2. 
113 Id. at 2. 
they trusted the Supreme Court.114 This meant that judges themselves considered 
the Supreme Court the least trustworthy institution in Slovakia. 
 
One thing has, however, changed. Before the introduction of the self-administration 
of the judiciary and the judicial council, one of the most frequently heard arguments 
was that the undue influence that the executive has over the judiciary must be 
misused in influencing decision-making of the courts and the individual judges. 
Judicial self-administration was thus presented as a way of protecting judicial 
independence and as preventing politicians from putting pressure on judges. 
However, even with self-administration and the shielding of judges from political 
pressures, the instances of influencing of judges and their individual decision-making 
still flourished and perhaps even increased in the period 2002-2009. The only 
difference was that before it could at least be maintained that these things were 
carried out by the corrupt political elite and because of system deficiencies. Now it 
was plainly the judges themselves who were to blame. 
 
Moreover, in 2009, with the election of Mr. Štefan Harabin to the presidency of the 
JCSR, the idea of judicial self-administration has lost any remaining credit in the 
Slovak society. So did also the idea that a judicial council of the Euro-model sort 
would be able to guarantee even basic degree of judicial independence. Already the 
advent of Harabin to the head of the JCSR is quite telling: Harabin, after being 
appointed as the minister of justice in 2006, publicly announced steps which would 
be aimed at limiting the “undue power” of the self-administration of the judges. 
However, later in 2008, when the position of President of the Supreme Court (and, by 
virtue of that position, also chairman of the JCSR) fell vacant, his policy changed. In 
early 2009, the Slovak government and parliament approved bills submitted by the 
minister of justice, Harabin. They carried out a series of amendments which 
broadened the scope of the self-administrative powers of the (already strong) JCSR, 
adding most significantly some budgetary and inspection powers. By this legislative 
change, the last remaining important competences of the ministry of justice were 
placed in the hands of the JCSR. In June 2009, As the Minister of Justice, Harabin, 
send the list of his preferred candidates to the JCSR, which exercised pressure on 
the electors. According to 2011 Woratsch report, due to this pressure several of his 
allies, many of which were court presidents, became members of the JCSR.115 Given 
this orchestrated support, Harabin, while still the minister of justice, was elected 
unanimously by the JCSR to the position of the President of the Supreme Court and 
therefore also to the position of the chairman of the JCSR.  
 
Since then, media allegations have included instances of corruption, nepotism and 
incompetence, the abuse of the powers of the Supreme Court president and the 
misuse of the JCSR‘s disciplinary powers against Harabin’s critics.116 Harabin was 
particularly eager to silence his critics at the Supreme Court. He himself initiated 12 
disciplinary motions against Supreme Court judges in 2009 and 2010. One more 
motion was triggered by the JCSR, which was chaired by him.117 Several lower court 
judges who dared to criticize Harabin also faced disciplinary trial, as a result of which 
they were often suspended and their salaries were significantly reduced during this 
interim period.118  
 
                                                          
114 Id. at 2. 
115 The Woratsch Report, supra note 105. 
116 See Bojarski & Köster, supra note 106; Dubovcová, supra note 106, at 54-56; or the Woratsch 
Report, supra note 105.  
117 Some of these cases are reported in Bojarski & Köster, supra note 106, at 102-105. 
118 Dubovcová, supra note 106, at 54-55. 
Harabin started to use other sticks also. Soon after he became the President of the 
Supreme Court, he reshuffled the composition of the chambers at the Supreme 
Court. He placed “recalcitrant” judges who did not agree with him in two chambers of 
the administrative division of the Supreme Court. He also made sure that these two 
chambers could decide on only certain categories of cases (such as detention cases, 
asylum, social security cases). All cases with a significant monetary aspect such as 
competition law or tax law cases went to other chambers. Harabin adopted the same 
attitude regarding assigning individual cases. He bypassed the random case 
assignment by selective reassigning of cases, allegedly on efficiency grounds. 
Sometimes he changed the work schedule, which determines general rules for case 
assignment, as frequently as 52 times per year. It was reported that recalcitrant 
judges were given an extra workload, approximately 60 cases more that obedient 
judges. The recalcitrant judges were also forced to decide on all detention cases that 
had to be decided within the statutory limit of seven days, which is an additional 
burden. These detention cases were initially supposed to be evenly distributed 
among all chambers, but Harabin eventually decided that they would be assigned 
only to the two chambers composed of recalcitrant judges.119  
 
Finally, Harabin employed also carrots. He awarded generous salary bonuses to his 
allies and denied them to his critics.120 According to a Supreme Court judge, the 
salary bonuses of the Supreme Court judges in 2009 and 2010 varied from 50 EUR 
per annum for recalcitrant judges to tens of thousands euros for obedient judges.121 
The differences between the salary bonuses of obedient judges and those of 
recalcitrant judges widened exponentially. Furthermore, all types of promotion 
became available only for “loyal” judges. 
 
In sum, the Slovak Judicial Council, created following the best practices of the Euro-
model, has turned gradually into a “mafia-like” structure of intra-judicial oppression, 
run in the name of “judicial independence” by judges who started their judicial 
careers in the communist period. Whereas before one might have nourished the 
perhaps somewhat idealistic hope that one day there would be enough political will to 
do something with the administration of justice, the hopes for a new reform of a 
stillborn model, which has meanwhile acquired a constitutional status, are now close 
to zero.  
 
Similar negative examples from other countries in the New Europe that established 
strong judicial councils, such as Hungary,122 Bulgaria,123 or Romania,124 keep telling 
the same story: granting extensive self-administration powers to the judiciary before 
its genuine internal reform is dangerous. In better scenario, the new institution will be, 
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Šikanovanie v talári, PLUS 7 DNÍ, 12 December 2011 [online at http://www.pluska.sk/plus7dni/vsimli-sme-
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eds., 2003) 12.  
123 See e.g. Smilov, supra note 19, at 313. 
124 Parau, supra note 12; Ramona Coman & Cristina Dallara, Judicial Independence in Romania, in 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION (Anja Seibert-Fohr ed., 2012).  
for a few years or decades to come, a somewhat empty shell. In the bad case 
scenario, which appears to be unfortunately more frequent, behaviour and patterns 
start emerging which are very distant from anything the model was supposed to 
deliver: judicial independence in the form of individual judicial independence and 
impartiality is not only unprotected, it may even be suppressed by judicial bosses. To 
speak of efficiency, quality, and/or transparency, i.e. of other values apart from the 
judicial independence the system promised to deliver, would amount to idealism 
bordering on naivety.  
 
Conversely, there is the example of the Czech Republic. Castigated in a number of 
international reports,125 the Czech Republic was considered, in terms of institutional 
reform of the judiciary, the “black sheep” of the CEE region. By a historical accident 
rather by a premeditated design, no judicial council was ever established in the 
Czech Republic, in spite of the EU pre-accession pressure. However, over the years, 
the post-communist Ministry of Justice model started evolving gradually: more and 
more powers have been de facto shared between the Ministry and court 
presidents.126 Today, the Czech judiciary, in particular through the court presidents, 
have a considerable say in the administration of courts. However, the power is 
shared between the Ministry and the presidents of courts. The system has thus been 
generating a different balance, which is perhaps more sound than judicial 
unilateralism and isolation in a judicial council: mutual checks and balances between 
the executive (controlled by the Parliament) and senior members of the judiciary.  
 
In face of the above outlined questionable if not outright negative experience with 
judicial councils, what one may see today in CEE are somewhat extreme political 
reactions and measures being taken against judicial councils and judicial bosses 
running them. A number of these measures are plainly inappropriate and extreme, 
being later censured by European institutions and/or the international community: the 
recent evolution in Hungary and the 2011 Hungarian constitutional reform is a case in 
point here.127 Some of the measures taken by the new Hungarian constitutional 
majority included radical reforms of the Hungarian judicial council and the judiciary as 
such.128 In spite of some of these measures being extreme, they should be read and 
understood in their context, which is not that dissimilar to other countries in the CEE. 
Politicians, lawyers as well as the general public became increasingly frustrated with 
the judicial (non)performance in the institutional context of judicial brotherhoods or 
even mafia-like structures declaring themselves to be untouchable due to their 
“constitutionally guaranteed” institutional independence. 
 
Extreme problems may unfortunately generate extreme reactions. However, before 
censoring or praising either side, it is always essential to acquaint oneself with the 
genuine state of affairs on the ground. With respect to the judiciary and its 
(non)reform, it would certainly be useful for a number of high-flying international 
academics, who tend to publicly censure reform proposals on the paper, to have a 
closer look at the genuine state of a number of judiciaries in the CEE. They could 
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perhaps go and try to get a case through the judicial system there. They could also 
acquaint themselves with persons and the style in which the institutions they are 
about to fervently advocate are in fact run. This is in no way a blind defence of 
problematic and often rather populist measures recently taken by a number of the 
CEE governments with respect to judges and the judiciary. It is rather a classical 
reminder that in any comparative study, understanding the context matters 
considerably. 
 
Finally, it should also be born in mind that with respect to already “hijacked” judicial 
councils in Slovakia as well as other CEE countries, time becomes of essence. 
Judicial councils in these countries were given considerable personal powers as well, 
relating to (non)promotion, salaries, and discipline of judges. Thus, potential 
dissenters within the judiciary are gradually weeded out (in disciplinary proceedings, 
by non-promotion, various other tools of oppression) and no potential dissenters are 
by definition allowed to enter the judiciary. The councils, or rather to say the judicial 
bosses running them, control the appointment of new judges as well. Personal 
control is translated into a full “inbreeding” of the existent structures: sub-optimal 
judges choose docile and sub-optimal judicial trainees as their off-spring. In the even 
least inventive scenario, judicial offices become de facto hereditary, with nepotistic 
family appointments of new judges becoming the rule.  
 
This evolution and this reality gives the final blow to suggestions that condemning 
judicial councils as an unsuitable institutional design for countries in transition some 
ten or fifteen years after their establishment in these countries is premature and too 
rush. True, no institution is perfect in its beginnings. Its positive elements may show 
only with time, once the environment and the people in it have matured as well. 
However, such pious wishes are completely off the point once the entire institution of 
the judicial council has not only been hijacked (which could indeed be just temporal), 
but the hijackers were also given the power to reproduce themselves, thus being able 
to impose themselves permanently and ensure their own continuation. One can 
always hope for positive changes in the future. These have, however, due to flawed 
institutional design, been delayed for years or, more realistically, for decades.  
 
9) CONCLUSIONS 
 
The authors of this contribution are certainly in favour of international standards and 
the European exchange of best practices. However, this paper and the case study 
concerning the spread of judicial councils in the New Europe under the influence of 
European institutions outlined therein unfortunately provided the textbook example 
for a case against international standards and best practices.  
 
The case study has shown that if unconstrained by a democratic process, negotiation 
and compromise-making with other branches of the government, the judiciary might 
be tempted to promote constitutionally separate, even insulated models of judicial 
administration. Such models strongly favour institutional independence of judges (or 
rather senior judicial officials), to the detriment of individual judicial independence 
and impartiality of judges. If politically unchecked, judicial wishes adopted on 
international/European level are then put into various non-binding instruments, which 
are then de facto imposed onto (yet) politically less stable systems. The effects might 
be problematic if not outright tragic.  
 
To be precise, there is no problem with judges meeting on the international level and 
making recommendations, devising best practices etc. Quite to the contrary, it is the 
people with expertise who should devise expert solutions. Such outcomes must be, 
however, made subject to democratic discussion and critical scrutiny by other actors 
on the international level itself, or, failing to do so, on the national level. Democratic 
parliamentary scrutiny might be available in only some environments (such as within 
the European Union, with directly elected European Parliament). However, at least 
executive scrutiny should be possible, with the representatives of national 
governments critically examining the proposals.  
 
Such critical review at different levels ought to be available under normal 
circumstances. The particular setting of the JC Euro-model exportation to the New 
Europe in the EU pre-accession period however demonstrated that sometimes, such 
scrutiny may get lost in the cracks of multi-layered international environments. In the 
old Member States, where such recommendations were indeed just 
recommendations, i.e. international soft law, no one cared much, because this was 
something primarily concerned with the reforms in the “East”.129 No one seriously 
thought of imposing these standards on the old Member States, being well aware of 
the strong political resistance. Such neglect might, however, eventually back-fire onto 
the old Member States, as they are now being pushed by the international 
organisations to adopt the same model as well.130 In the new Member States, with 
political processes weakened, there was not much of serious democratic discussion, 
which would not be quickly overridden by the all-powerful argument “Europe wills it”. 
Thus, as this case study furthermore demonstrated, the label “soft law” or 
“recommendations only” might be quite misleading with respect to a number of 
instruments adopted on the international level. As far as their capacity permits, other 
branches of government, national or supranational, would be well-advised to monitor 
soft law production very closely. The “soft” rules might become “hard” rules quite 
quickly.  
 
Finally, in view of the evidence emerging from the CEE countries, it is suggested that 
the Euro JC model is unsuitable institutional design for countries in transition. Judicial 
councils should cease to be promoted as “the solution” to judicial reform in Europe 
and on the global scale. If adopting grand new institutions is not the best way forward 
for a judiciary in transition, what is then? With respect to transition countries, we 
believe that personal renewal of the judiciaries must precede steps towards more 
“macro” constitutional independence for the judiciary as such. The “micro” 
independence, i.e. the independence and impartiality of individual judges, must be 
established and guaranteed first. But this can in fact be achieved without a judicial 
council, or even, with tongue-in-cheek, especially if there is no judicial council, as the 
example of a number of other European countries daily demonstrate. Equally, the 
discussed “black sheep” of the CEE transition region, the Czech Republic, might be 
now and also certainly in the nearest future with respect to individual judicial 
independence and performance much better off than Slovakia, the exemplary pupil of 
the JC Euro-model. Both countries, however, started from fairly similar settings with 
their negotiated break-up in 1993.  
 
Put differently, the JC model is unsuitable for countries in transition, where internal 
ethical culture and strong sense of judicial duty are still lacking. On the other hand, 
“do as you please” tactic is perhaps not helpful either. What we suggest is, in the first 
years and decade or two of transition, to divert the effort from the large-scale 
institutional design to smaller scale reforms, in particular by putting emphasis on 
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enhancing efficiency and transparency within the judiciary and on writ-small 
mechanisms. These steps may include, among other things, open and transparent 
procedures for appointment and promotion of judges within the existing system of 
judicial appointments; openness to middle and senior level judicial appointments to 
the candidates from outside the professional judiciary; education and formation of 
judges, including foreign languages and international experience; expanding auxiliary 
judicial staff in courts, thus de-burdening judges from administrative duties; 
professionalism in the case and court management; publication of all judicial 
decisions online; uploading bios of judges on the website of the relevant courts; 
providing real-time information about how each case file is handled; strictly random 
case assignment; and so on.  
 
Among all the avenues of smaller scale reforms mentioned, one clearly stands out in 
terms of importance: the issue of open, transparent and competitive access to the 
judicial profession. If a transition country is able to establish and maintain it, half the 
battle for judicial reform has already been won. Unfortunately, the JC model as 
practiced in the CEE countries as well as in a number of Latin countries of its origin 
has precisely the opposite the tendency: corporativism, mental closure, and even 
favouritism and nepotism in selection of new judges, if done only by the judges 
themselves. Any judicial body selected in this way, its quality and performance, will 
be by default always highly questionable, to say at least.  
 
On a deeper level, it is apparent that our yardsticks for a successful judicial 
transformation are more rooted in the focus on the quintessential nature of judging: 
independent and impartial decision in an individual case, delivered in a speedy way 
and in a reasonable quality. For that, individual guarantees on a micro-level are 
essential, together with strong individual judges. Unfortunately, what the Euro-model 
of judicial councils brings about in transition countries is strong institutional 
independence of the sum of judges, or rather the complete lack of control of few 
senior judicial officials, but little of individual judicial independence and courage. Put 
metaphorically, if one were to say that early post-communist judges were slightly 
disoriented fearful mongrels who the transition was supposed to transform into hard 
pulling independent horses, the CEE countries which introduced an Euro-modelled 
judicial council ended up with a flock of neurotic sheep and wolves disguised as 
shepherds.  
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